Summary.-the Implicit association test (Iat) provides a relative measure of implicit association strengths between target and attribute categories. in contrast, the Single Category Implicit association test (SC-Iat) measures association strength with a single attribute category. this can be advantageous if a complementary category-as used in the Iat-cannot be composed or is undesired. If the SC-Iat is to be a meaningful supplement to the Iat, it should meet the same requirements. In an online experiment with a large and heterogeneous sample, the fakability of both implicit measures was investigated when measuring anxiety. Both measures were fakable through specific instruction (e.g., "slow down your reactions") but unfakable through nonspecific faking instruction even though nonspecific instruction was given immediately before the critical blocks (e.g., "Alter your reaction times"). When comparing the methodological quality of both implicit measures, the SC-Iat had lower internal consistency than the Iat. moreover, with specific faking instructions, the sc-iAt was possible to fake to a larger extent than the Iat.
the Implicit association test (Iat; greenwald, mcghee, & Schwartz, 1998) is the most widely used method to measure implicit (i.e., automatic, habitual; for a definition, see de Houwer, teige-Mocigemba, spruyt, & moors, 2009 ) evaluations because it is easy to administer, robust, and has satisfying reliability compared to other implicit measures (greenwald, et al., 1998; greenwald & Nosek, 2001; fazio & Olson, 2003) . the Iat measures the strength of associations between distinct concepts through differences in reaction time. it is based on a speeded classification task where word or picture stimuli are categorized into one of four concepts in five consecutive blocks. error feedback is given if stimuli are incorrectly assigned to categories. the idea behind the Iat is as follows: if two concepts are highly associated with each other, assigning stimuli to the appropriate categories will be easier (i.e., faster) if they share the same response key. a major advantage of the Iat is that it is possible to assess automatic evaluations, which are less prone to social desirability and impression management tendencies than self-report measures (De houwer, et al., 2009) . this makes the Iat especially interesting for measuring sensitive concepts such as aggression (e.g., Uhlmann & Swanson, 2004; Voracek & Stieger, 2009 ), racism (e.g., gawronski, 2002 ), anxiety (e.g., egloff & schmukle, 2002 , or stereotypes as well as prejudice (e.g., gawronski, 2002) . although popular, the Iat has shortcomings.
One of the problems with the Iat is that it is impossible to derive evaluations of single attribute concepts because the iAt measures strengths of associations between two complementary concepts (e.g., anxiety-calmness) rather than one concept on its own (e.g., anxiety; Nosek, greenwald, & Banaji, 2007) . there are several implicit measures that attempt to overcome this shortcoming, such as the go/No-go association task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) or the extrinsic Affective simon task (de Houwer, 2003) . however, these paradigms have low reliability (e.g., Rudolph, Schröder-abé, Schütz, gregg, & Sedikides, 2008) . In contrast, another implicit measure, the Single Category Implicit association test (SC-Iat; karpinski & Steinman, 2006)-as a variant of the Iat-has acceptable validity and reliability (e.g., Huijding & de Jong, 2006; karpinski & steinman, 2006; Penke, eichstaedt, & asendorpf, 2006; Wigboldus, holland, & van knippenberg, 2006; Bluemke & friese, 2008; Richetin & Perugini, 2008) .
Several studies have assessed whether the Iat is insensitive to impression management or deliberate faking by test takers (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; egloff & schmukle, 2002; kim, 2003; steffens, 2004; Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; schnabel, Banse, & asendorpf, 2006; Nosek, et al., 2007) . In general, studies have indicated that: (1) the Iat is much less fakable than self-report measures, (2) the Iat is only slightly fakable through explicit self-presentation instructions (e.g., "try not to appear shy"), and (3) experience with the iAt and specific instruction on how to distort the iAt score (e.g., "slow down purposely in Block 3") increase fakability significantly (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Nosek, et al., 2007). karpinski and Steinman (2006) found that the SCIat was fakable through self-presentation instructions, but such instructions also raised error rates. When participants with many errors were excluded, only a small and nonsignificant effect (d = 0.24) of faking remained (karpinski & Steinman, 2006) . to advance the knowledge on intentional faking through explicit instructions, this study augments past research by not only looking at Iat's fakability but by adding the SC-Iat as another implicit measure. as the SC-Iat potentially is an improvement of the Iat because of its applicability for measuring single attitude concepts, the purpose of the study at hand is to investigate the SC-Iat's vulnerability to faking compared to the Iat. fiedler and Bluemke (2005) showed that participants were best able to distort the iAt purposely if they were instructed specifically on how to fake, for example, by slowing down reactions in one of the critical blocks. however, it remains unclear if and under what conditions participants can develop a faking strategy on their own. In the current study, participants were instructed in a nonspecific manner not only at the beginning of the Iat but also prior to each critical block (i.e., Blocks 3 and 5). Being told the block in which to fake adds vital information for faking the Iat, as Blocks 1, 2, and 4 are irrelevant for the Iat score. If participants receive nonspecific faking instruction prior to the critical blocks by being told to alter their reaction times but are not told the best faking strategy (i.e., slowing down in one critical block), perhaps participants themselves would be able to find the best strategy for faking. Faking was defined as changing one's reaction time to the stimuli, which in turn alters one's Iat score.
In the current study, four research questions were tested. first, would participants be able to fake the iAt if nonspecific instructions to fake (i.e., altering reaction times) are given just before the critical blocks? this additional information on where faking is successful (i.e., only in the critical blocks) might enhance participants' success at altering their Iat scores. Second, does the same apply to the SC-Iat? One might expect that the SC-Iat is easier to fake than the Iat because of its simpler structure of three instead of five blocks. third, would the iAt and sc-iAt differ in fakability when specific faking instructions are provided (i.e., slowing down in one critical block)? fourth, does participants' age and sex moderate their success at faking the Iat as well as the SC-Iat? to investigate these research questions, an experiment was conducted consisting of a control group (no faking instruction), a nonspecific fake instruction group (altering reaction times), and a specific fake instruction group with instructions on how to best fake the implicit measure (slowing down in one critical block). faking success was operationalized as a mean SC-Iat or iAt score statistically significantly different from the control group mean.
Method

Participants and Procedure
Students from an online address book and individuals from an online panel (i.e., people from all walks of life who had signed up to occasionally participate in web-based studies on various topics) were invited via e-mail to participate in a web-based study. In this invitation for participation, the web link to an online questionnaire was embedded, including a personal key enabling automatic login to the questionnaire (see heerwegh & loos-veldt, 2003) . With this key, it was possible to prevent multiple submissions as well as check data on age and sex.
Of the 8,083 invitations that were sent out, 2,362 unique visitors called up the first page of the questionnaire during the 4 wk. the study was in the field. thus, the response rate was 29%. After data cleaning (wrong key, deception on age and sex, and It problems), 2,300 data sets remained for analysis.
according to the self-reported age and sex, participants were on average 29 yr. old (SD = 9), and 45% were women. At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked if they had tried to fake the tests (i.e., manipulation check). A total of 263 participants in the faking conditions (11.4%) declared not to have faked the test for several reasons (e.g., "didn't know about faking," "didn't want to," "Was too tired"). they were excluded from the fakability analyses.
Materials
Questionnaire.-first, participants were asked their age and sex and then given instructions on the implicit measure (iAt or sc-iAt). After that, participants were either presented with an Iat to measure implicit anxiety or two SC-Iats to measure implicit anxiety and implicit calmness in counterbalanced order. each implicit measure started as a java applet in the participant's web browser. toward the end, an open-ended question was asked: "did you try to fake the test?"
Iat/SC-Iat.-An anxiety iAt was used, as described by egloff and Schmukle (2002) . the Iat is a reaction-time-based method that consists of five blocks (cf. table 1). in the first block, the target concept was introduced. Stimulus words were presented in the middle of the screen that needed to be categorized either under the target category "i" on the lefthand side of the screen or the target category "other" on the right-hand side of the screen by pressing the keys "e" or "i," respectively (stimulus words: self: I, self, my, me, own; other: they, them, your, you, others). Participants were asked to press a key as quickly as possible without making too many mistakes. If a stimulus word was categorized under the wrong concept, a red "X" appeared on the screen, and categorization needed to be rectified by pressing the correct key. in the anxiety iAt, each stimulus word was presented three times, resulting in 30 trials. In the second block, the attribute concept was introduced. stimulus words needed to be categorized under the attribute categories "anxiety" or "calmness" (stimulus words were anxiety: nervous, afraid, fearful, anxious, uncertain; calmness: relaxed, balanced, at ease, calm, restful). again, each stimulus word was presented three times, resulting in 30 trials. the third block was the first combined block. target and attribute concepts were paired on each side of the screen resulting in the combinations of "i and anxiety" and "other and calmness." In this block, stimulus words pertaining to the target concept as well as to the attribute concept were alternated. this block consisted of 60 trials. Block 4 was the reversed version of Block 1, that is, the categories were switched (i.e., "i" was presented on the right-hand side of the screen and "other" on the left). Block 5 was another combined block similar to Block 3, but with reversed combinations ("other and anxiety," "i and calmness"). to minimize the influence of order effects on individual differences, stimuli were presented in a fixed sequence (Asendorpf, et al., 2002) . the inter-trial interval was 150 msec. Blocks 3 and 5 were counterbalanced. the sc-iAt is based on the same principles as the iAt, but only one attribute category is presented at a time, so there were three blocks instead of five (table 1) . thus, to measure both anxiety and calmness, two sc-iAts (anxiety SC-Iat, calmness SC-Iat) were used. With the Iat and the anxiety sc-iAt, higher values reflect lower implicit anxiety. With the calmness sc-iAt, higher values reflect higher implicit calmness.
Design
A 2 (implicit measure: iAt, sc-iAt) × 3 (faking instruction: control, nonspecific instruction, specific instruction) between-subjects design was used. With the first experimental variation, either one anxiety iAt or both SC-Iats were presented. this was done because the Iat and the SC-Iat can interfere with each other (karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Wigboldus, et al., 2006) . the order of presentation of the two SC-Iats was counterbalanced because different sc-iAts can also interfere with each other (karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Wigboldus, et al., 2006) . the second experimental variation pertained to faking. in the first condition, no faking instructions were presented (i.e., control group). In the second condition, nonspecific faking instructions were presented ["Please try to fake the following block by altering your reaction times (quicker or slower) but don't make too many mistakes"]. these instructions were given as part of the general instruction in the beginning and repeated before the relevant blocks of the Iat (Blocks 3 and 5) as well as the SC-Iats (Blocks 2 and 3). In the third condition, participants were instructed to fake the implicit measures in a specific manner (Block 3 of the Iat and Block 2 of the sc-iAt: "try to fake this block by sLoWing doWn your reaction on purpose"; Block 5 of the iAt and Block 3 of the sc-iAt: "try to fake this block by SPeeDINg UP your reaction"). to increase visibility of the faking instructions, black bold letters were used on a red background within a black rectangle. the task took 10-15 min. depending on whether the Iat or two SC-Iats were administered.
Data Preparation
following greenwald and colleagues (1998), the first two responses of Blocks 3 and 5 were discarded. Response times of less than 300 msec. and higher than 3,000 msec. were set to 300 msec. and 3,000 msec., respectively. if a person made more than 10% errors, his or her data were discarded. response times in milliseconds were log-transformed, and a difference between the mean response time of Blocks 3 and 5 was calculated. this difference is called the iAt effect. the same procedure was applied to the SC-Iat with the exception that Blocks 2 and 3 were the relevant blocks.
2
Prior to statistical analyses, counterbalancing was accounted for.
results to determine internal consistency of both implicit measures, only the control group was used. differences were calculated for each response time in the relevant blocks (e.g., iAt: first response time in Block 5, first response time in Block 3, and so on), according to Bosson, Swann, and Pennebaker (2000) . for the Iat, Cronbach's α was .83; for the anxiety SC-Iat, α = .69; and for the calmness sc-iAt, α = .63.
overall, faking attempts significantly affected scores on the iAt and SC-Iat compared to the control group ( fig. 1; aNOVa in table 2) . With the iAt, the fake specific group significantly differed from the control fig. 1 . implicit Association test ( ) and Single Category Implicit association test (anxiety, ; Calmness, ) effects by faking instruction group, while the fake-unspecific group did not (scheffé post hoc test, see table 2). the same pattern was found for the anxiety and calmness scIat (table 2) . to test for possible effects of participants' age and sex on faking success, two-way analyses of covariance (aNCOVas) were calculated with faking instruction and sex as factors and age as a covariate. there were no statistically significant main effects of sex or age on faking success (all Fs < 1.30) nor interactions between sex and faking instruction (all Fs < 0.38). However, there was one statistically significant interaction between sex and faking instruction with the anxiety SC-Iat: men compared to women faked slightly more successfully when given a specific faking instruction than when given a nonspecific one. However, the size of this interaction effect was very small and probably not of practical relevance (F 2,638 = 3.60, p = .03; η p 2 = .011). discussion the current study examined the fakability of the Iat as well as SCiAt due to providing participants with unspecific (i.e., "Alter your reaction times") or specific faking instructions (i.e. "slow down in one critical block"). faking instructions were not only presented at the beginning of the implicit measure, but also at the beginning of the critical blocks in contrast to other studies also analyzing the fakability of the Iat. this refinement in nonspecifically instructing participants also at the beginning of each critical block did not result in more success at faking the Iat and SC-Iat. this is especially interesting in the case of the SC-Iat. One could argue that because the sc-iAt consists of only three blocks instead of five, participants more easily grasp the SC-Iat's logic, and in turn, are more successful at faking the sc-iAt compared to the iAt. With a nonspecific faking instruction, this does not appear to be the case (see table 2). however, with a specific faking instruction, this does seem to be the case: the difference between the iAt faking effect and the mean sc-iAt faking effect was statistically significant (see confidence intervals of η 2 p in table 2). thus, with specific faking instructions, both the iAt and sc-iAt are fakable, but the SC-Iat is fakable to a larger extent. Using the SC-Iat for the measurement of sensitive topics could therefore be problematic if the motivation to hide one's real attitude might be high. Furthermore, there were no noteworthy influences of participants' sex or age on faking success. the results are limited by the fact that following experimenter's instruction to fake might not be the same as acting on one's self-motivated intention to fake (e.g., achieve good results when being tested during a job application). this limitation may be avoided in the future by applying an experimental design with more naturalistic appeal, for example by embedding the experiment in a simulated job application procedure. fur-thermore, the current study was conducted on an online sample, that is, participants completed the experiment in a nonlaboratory setting. this entails the disadvantage of less control (but see Stieger & Reips, 2010) . Replicating the findings in a laboratory setting could strengthen the results by, for example, instructing participants to fake not only in writing but (also) orally.
Furthermore, the nonspecific faking instruction used was nonspecific about the target category to fake. despite being given a faking instruction dealing with influencing reaction times, some participants might have chosen to fake toward the content of the implicit measures, that is, to fake toward anxiety or calmness. Participants' complementary faking strategies with the same implicit measure (e.g., Iat: slower in Block 3 and faster in Block 5 vs faster in Block 3 and slower in Block 5) might have cancelled each other out, thus erroneously suggesting that they were unsuccessful at faking. a post hoc test of variance heterogeneity between the control and nonspecific faking instruction group revealed a statistically significant difference for the calmness sc-iAt [Levene test: F 1,460 = 9.18, p = .003, variance ratio (VR) = 1.30, indicates that the nonspecific faking instruction group had a 1.3 higher variance than the control group], but not for the Iat and anxiety SC-Iat (F 1,422 = 1.66, p = .20, VR = 1.14; F 1,450 = 0.01, p = .91, VR = 1.09). if some participants had successfully faked the calmness sc-iAt-as the larger variance of the sc-iAt effect might suggest at first sight-it is surprising that participants were unable to fake the procedurally identical anxiety SC-Iat. given this inconsistency across the two SCIats, the somewhat larger variance ratio with the calmness SC-Iat is unlikely to reflect a covering up of successful faking due to complementary faking strategies. however, future research should analyze this result in more detail by applying a within-subject design to differentiate between complementary faking strategies using the unspecific faking instruction.
When comparing the methodological quality of both implicit measures, the SC-Iat had lower internal consistency than the Iat. moreover, with specific faking instructions, the sc-iAt was fakable to a larger extent than the Iat. these results provide further head-to-head comparisons of the SC-Iat and the Iat (Bluemke & friese, 2008; Richetin & Perugini, 2008) .
